

1-31-1961

# The Basic Problem of Latin America

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield\\_speeches](https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches)

---

## Recommended Citation

Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "The Basic Problem of Latin America" (1961). *Mike Mansfield Speeches*. 506.  
[https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield\\_speeches/506](https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/506)

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [scholarworks@mso.umt.edu](mailto:scholarworks@mso.umt.edu).



(3) there is the obvious absence of a code or clear rules of international law or definition of legal disputes realistically protecting us from judicial interference with our foreign policy, upon which we depend for national security.

On the other hand, if the world peace through law program is reoriented to give priority to the solution of these problems, it may, as nations gradually gain confidence, be helpful in the limited area where disputes are really subject to judicial solution. However, any implication that this alone will bring peace is a harmful delusion. Manifestly, all history proves that most wars are due to political disputes, which can only be solved by agreements reached after the give-and-take of diplomatic negotiations—in which judges would have no rules and for which they have no qualifications.

Let us hitch our wagon to the stars, but not deceive ourselves by substituting slogans for solutions—nor, as lawyers, omit relevant facts and ignore alternative solutions in the current debate on Connally.

#### THE BASIC PROBLEM OF LATIN AMERICA

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I invite the attention of my colleagues to a very scholarly, enlightening, and forthright article which appeared in the New York Times magazine of December 4, 1960. It was written by our distinguished majority leader, the senior Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and is entitled "The Basic Problem of Latin America."

In it the distinguished Senator suggests that we must start planning and coordinating our overseas policies in regard to Latin America. He refers to the "beachhead societies" along the coasts of Latin America, and the wide gap between those beachheads and the poverty-stricken masses in the interior. It is his wise belief—and well should it be observed by Members of the Congress—that our country, along with Latin American countries, should integrate and coordinate their policies, if we are to make our future position in Latin America meaningful and truly helpful.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE BASIC PROBLEM OF LATIN AMERICA (By MIKE MANSFIELD)

When the new administration takes office in January it will find the old problems of Latin America still on the doorstep of the White House. It will not be able to step over or around these problems. It is going to have to face them frankly, decide promptly what can be done about them and begin in earnest to act on them.

As a nation, we have reawakened to our stake in the Western Hemisphere and certain recent actions of Congress reflect this reawakening. We have, for example, expanded the lending facilities of our Export-Import Bank and joined in the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank. Most recently, Congress proposed a broad new approach to the inter-American problems in authorizing \$500 million to begin a new aid program. And Under Secretary Dillon followed through at the Inter-American economic meeting at Bogotá, Colombia, with a pledge of U.S. cooperation in dealing with Latin America's economic and social problems.

In short, the legal means for a new approach to Latin America have been accumulated. Their effective use awaits the touch of alert and sensitive leadership from the new administration.

The importance of that kind of leadership in inter-American affairs cannot be overemphasized. Unless it is present, there is a danger that we shall interpret the Latin American situation primarily in terms of Castroism and communism. If we do so, the basic problem will elude us. To be sure, Castroism and communism are powerful forces, but they are in the nature of an effect rather than a cause. Underlying their presence on the stage in Cuba and in the wings elsewhere in Latin America is a more fundamental factor.

In plainest terms, the basic problem of Latin America is that the social structures of many nations of the region are seriously out of date and cannot endure in their present form in the second half of the 20th century. They cannot endure for the simple reason that they do not deliver enough education, enough food, shelter and clothing, enough medical aid, enough of the conveniences that are taken for granted in this country and are relatively commonplace in Western Europe and even in Soviet Russia. Most important, they do not provide for a sufficient number of people that intangible but essential element of prideful participation in the present and hope for the future which is the keynote of political stability.

The inability of many Latin American nations to meet the needs of their people arises not so much from underdevelopment as from extremely lopsided development. In Peru, for example, during a plane flight of 2 hours one can travel to places that differ in development by several centuries.

That is the extent of the lag between the capital of Lima with its wide boulevards, plazas, skyscrapers, modern conveniences and traffic problems and the quiet, wretchedly poor villages in the Andean highlands to the east, inhabited by illiterate Indians who scratch out a bare existence using primitive agricultural methods. Flying 2 hours further to the east, the plane sets down in an isolated clearing in the Amazonian jungle stalked by tribespeople who still hunt with poison-tipped darts. Here the social lag is measured in millennia.

In Lima itself, a literate and cultured minority live surrounded by a vast urban poor whose lot is one of unspeakable squalor. The poor know what decent housing is but they do not have it. They know that modern medical care can cure but they are not cured. They know that education is beneficial but they are not educated. In short, the deficiencies of modern life are clearly visible to them and, just as clearly, beyond their reach.

Peru is not unique. Lopsided development is to be found in greater or lesser degree in just about every nation in Latin America. It is a consequence of the unique complex of cultural and economic forces that has shaped these societies over the centuries.

The modern Latin American nations began as beachheads in the New World in much the same way as did our original 13 States. Unlike this Nation, however, the social structure of most of our southern neighbors more or less atrophied in this form.

The European-derived minorities in the cities provided the economic organization necessary for a limited tapping of the great natural wealth of the interiors, which was funneled abroad largely in the form of exports of food and raw materials. The returns from these exports were hoarded or spent abroad or were stopped largely at the beachhead cities. This process underlies the great concentration of wealth in a few hands and the spectacular growth of some Latin American cities into islands of lush modernism

and great culture in a sea of social stagnation.

For the many Latin Americans in the city slums and particularly in the hinterlands, the process has had little constructive relevance. Through generations they have continued to live out their lives in ancient Indian and tribal patterns. Or if they have been drawn into the process, it has been to provide the labor to grow, to extract and to move commodities to the beachheads. They have received few benefits in the form of sufficient food, better health, greater comforts and opportunities for self-development.

Not only in an economic sense have most of the people of Latin America been bystanders, or mere cogs, in the beachhead societies. They were also bypassed for a long time by the concepts of responsible government and freedom when these ideas invaded Latin America in the 19th century.

These new clarions did not reach much beyond the beachheads and they were heard almost exclusively by the small minorities. The balance of the populace was summoned by them, if at all, only at moments of quixotic flareup which changed rulers without bringing about changes in the basic structure of Latin American society.

The pressure for deep change in this structure, however, has been accumulating steadily for several decades, notably since World War II. It is fed from intricate sources but certainly it is due for the major part to the stagnation of agriculture under antiquated systems of production and exploitative systems of land tenure at a time of rapidly expanding population.

It is fed, too, by the beginnings of an industrialization that has intensified urban concentration and brought more and more people into a direct awareness of the inadequacy of their lot in contrast to the glaring wealth and opportunities of a few.

Perhaps most of all, the accumulating pressure for deep-seated change is a consequence of modern communications. Ideas no longer stop at the beachheads. The slum dwellers of the Latin-American cities and the poverty-stricken villagers of the hinterlands alike have heard the message from this country, from Europe, and from Soviet Russia.

Millions of Latin Americans are now persuaded that a stoic suffering of misery or repression is not a virtue. The more that this concept is disseminated and takes root, the more the pressure for change intensifies and along with it the search for leaders capable of bringing about such change.

Responsible Latin-American statesmen know that the long-range problem confronting their countries is to convert the beachhead societies into stable national structures. But the immediate problem is to cut the social lags which exist between the cities and the hinterlands, between the affluent minorities and the poor in the cities themselves. For, because of these lags, the pitch of the demagog more often than not is able to rise above the voice of reason, and the tangible promises of repressive ideologies tend to swamp the abstractions of freedom.

An adequate solution to the immediate problem of social lag is essential if durable progress is to be made on the long-range problem of developing responsible, stable governments in Latin America.

The key to the solution is an indigenous leadership which has the courage to risk shifting substantially the base of political support from the entrenched and powerful few to the many. Even if the shift is made, the leadership must still have the wisdom and restraint to use this broadened political power not for a new entrenchment of personal power but for the building of institutions of freedom and progress.

That kind of leadership has not been conspicuous in Latin America until com-



more than one judge.<sup>16</sup> Can anyone really doubt how any judges nominated by dictators like Castro, Nasser, Trujillo, Sukarno, Nkrumah and Toure and many others, whether Communist or not, will vote on issues which their bosses deem vital to their own nations?

The election of judges is by concurrent action of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The 11-member Security Council already has one permanent Communist member, and when the neutralists led by Nehru (and also many western nations) have their way with the admission of Red China, there will be two permanent Communist members. But in addition to that, the majority of the Security Council (six) are elected by the General Assembly bi-annually—which thus has the ultimate control of the composition of the Security Council. The United States has but one vote out of 99 (the present membership of the General Assembly). By contrast, the African bloc alone has a vote of 26.<sup>17</sup> Yet it is not merely those who openly cooperate with the Soviets, like Nkrumah, but Nehru, who is currently reported as saying the United Nations Charter is "weighted too much in favor of Europe and the Americas at the expense of Asia and Africa."<sup>18</sup>

We are not concerned with diplomatic reasons for the tremendous changes now going on, or with the future of the United Nations, but solely with the obvious fact that the electoral machinery for World Court judges plainly invites political maneuvering. It should be manifest to all that as the present six vacancies are filled and as a third of the Court is triennially renewed, the World Court will include not only two Communist judges as at present, but more and more judges, whether coming from Communist or other monolithic states, who will regard themselves as agents of their respective states with no tradition of an independent judiciary. If we are interested in nonpolitical and unbiased judges, is not such political jockeying and maneuvering in the changing General Assembly (and indirectly in the Security Council) and the future per-

sonnel of the World Court infinitely more important than the past voting records of prior judges (so stressed by proponents), which largely reflect (a) their selection by a smaller number of more advanced nations before the cold war became so hot, and (b) decisions in cases which have not involved matters of the magnitude which could lead to peace or war, or which involved national security?

The present argument is not whether biased judges will constitute a majority of the Court. No lawyer wants even a few biased judges. Decisions often turn on a few votes. For example, there were 5 dissents and 1 partial dissent out of 14 judges sitting in the World Court in the Corfu case (Senate hearings, 360). There were divided opinions in 75 percent of the cases heard in the last term of our own Supreme Court, including a 5-to-4 division in a matter involving Federal supremacy over the States.

It can hardly be doubted how the admittedly Communist judges would act in cases that might involve, for example, Cuba and Panama. But would not judges from the Arabic countries, in view of the recent cancellation of the canal lease, be likewise biased? So that matter, how would judges from the South American bloc react? Or on questions of confiscation and expropriation of property in Cuba or elsewhere, how would judges from countries which have recently indulged in the same practice free themselves of their national interest? Our Guantanamo Naval Base, under perpetual lease from Cuba (obtained after we had freed Cuba from Spain), is concededly the keystone of our Caribbean defense. Castro currently threatens to have our rights determined by "international law." Are we really willing to delegate its disposal, which may involve our national survival, to such a court?<sup>19</sup>

If the issues involved are minor legal disputes not really involving fundamental issues, then we must realize and accept the view that a program of world peace through law must be much more gradual than its proponents suggest. If, on the other hand, the World Court is really to decide issues involving international disputes of a magnitude which may lead to war, then we must be prepared to transfer from our elected representatives to a World Court decisions involving fundamental national foreign policy and our national security. If the latter, few judges on a World Court will find it humanly possible to divorce themselves from their overriding interest in and their loyalty to, their own country and its allies.

Are there then any rules limiting the jurisdiction of the World Court and defining the law it would administer?

#### VAGUENESS OF JUSTICIABLE DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Bar associations spend much effort in making domestic law more certain and predictable through codification, uniform statutes, restatement of the law, etc. Courts demand precision of statute as a protection to defendants in the criminal courts. Where is the precision in the international law which nobody has attempted to codify? Yet, certainty is of transcendent importance to whole nations if the program of "world peace through law" is to resolve issues which may really involve peace or war. Do we find any real guide for judges from 15 nations in the loose language of article 38 of the statute?

1. International custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law? Surely customs have varied widely between nations and have been both accepted and rejected at various times, so that there is little area where agreement is general. Or in

2. Principles of law recognized by civilized nations—Moslem? Asian? South American?

<sup>19</sup> See Hanson Baldwin, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 24, 1960.

African? Is Cuba civilized after 60 years of independence, or Congo after 90 days? But can the World Court say members of the United Nations are not even civilized?<sup>20</sup> Or in

3. Publicists' teachings. There will be much difference of opinion on who are authoritative publicists and, as pointed out above, it is conceded that the area of international law is increasing.

Nor could decisions of the World Court have much effect as precedents (statute, art. 59). Surely, it is infinitely more important in this realm of conflicting ideologies, legal systems, opposing rules of publicists, than in the field of relatively uniform domestic law to codify, or at least define, the rules in advance. Lack of certainty was but recently stated to be the basic cause of the widespread distrust and disuse of the World Court.<sup>21</sup>

Then again, there is no clear rule on what is justiciable and what is political. This goes to the heart of the matter and is not solved by restriction to legal disputes. The claim<sup>22</sup> that matters so politically important as the Berlin and Suez crises could be materially affected by judicial decisions seems incredible. Does anyone actually believe that significant parts of these issues will be left to a court to decide in the light of current history? Or the Cuban crisis, where (absent a political solution by the Organization of American States) the President has indicated the (unilateral) Monroe Doctrine will be invoked if necessary to hemispheric defense and our national safety?

It is now argued by proponents that a World Court would be helpful to the collection of financial claims. Aside from the legal problem posed by the limitation of access to the World Court to only nations as parties, under Article 34(1) of the statute, there is no substantial record of its successful use for this purpose in the past, and certainty of law in this limited area is just as essential for a World Court as for a domestic court.

#### CONCLUSION

The cold war since 1946 has demonstrated the imperative need for caution in unilateral judicial disarmament. It is submitted therefore that this is not the time to repeal the Connally amendment because (1) it would weaken our position vis-à-vis, not only Communist nations but substantially all great powers, unless we substitute some of their non-Connally type safety conditions or reservations;<sup>23</sup> (2) the World Court will inevitably include more and more Communist and political judges as the relative voting power of the more advanced Western nations continues to decline through the admission of numerous little primitive states;

<sup>20</sup> Yet neither Communist nations nor many of the new members are "civilized" under orthodox definitions—e.g., 1 Oppenheim, "International Law" 1905, p. 31; Hall, "International Law" 1909, p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> E.g., Rhyne, *supra*, note 14.

<sup>22</sup> See World Peace Through Law Committee Report, page 24.

<sup>23</sup> Such as (a) the right to withdraw at will, like most of the great powers, or (b) a clearer national security reservation, which was the obvious intent of the Connally Reservation and which is inherent in a conception of national sovereignty. It should be noted that such reservations are much broader than the Connally-type reservation, since they plainly would cover political disputes as well as legal disputes. (c) Professor Sohn (46 A.B.A.J. 25) called sixteen reservations major without counting the right to withdraw at will, and suggested alternatives to outright repeal. These also should be studied instead of being blandly ignored as they are by the leaders in the repeal movement.



paratively recent times. But it is beginning, now, to appear with increasing frequency. Wherever it has appeared, as in Venezuela and Peru, to cite just two examples, its hold is still most tenuous. The old centers of power contract slowly and the social lags still breed demagogues.

Yet, in spite of these obstacles, the transition from beachhead to modern states must go forward. If it is not led by those who believe in freedom, it will surely be pushed by those who do not. Specifically, any Latin American nation which tackles this problem must move on several fronts simultaneously:

1. It must act, at once, to alleviate the most glaring inadequacies in diet, housing, and health from which tens of millions of people suffer.

2. It must improve agriculture by diversifying crops, broadening land ownership, expanding cultivable acreage, and introducing modern agricultural techniques on a wide scale in order to increase production, particularly of food.

3. It must bring about the establishment of a steadily expanding range of industries.

4. It must wipe out illiteracy within a few years and provide adequate facilities to educate an ever-increasing number of highly trained technicians, specialists, and professionals to provide the whole range of modern services.

5. It must end the relative isolation of the beachheads from the interiors and the parts of the interior from one another by a vast enlargement of existing systems of transportation and communications.

Effective free government in Latin America can achieve much of what needs to be done by marshaling the unused or partially used labor potential and capital of its own people. It can act to transfer initiative, energies, and resources from Paris and Monte Carlo, so to speak, to Arequipa and Tucumán.

But even if these sources have been tapped, the total capacity for doing what must be done is likely to fall short of the job. It is precisely at this point that recognition of our long-range national interest, and acceptance of the responsibilities of leadership in this hemisphere, can be decisive.

In the past our economic policies respecting Latin America have not been focused on the problem of the beachhead nature of its societies. We have dabbled at the inner difficulties of the Latin American nations with small point 4 programs and in other random ways. These have helped—but in a most limited fashion.

The emphasis of our policies has been on encouraging the flow of private U.S. investment. This approach has had the effect of reinforcing the beachheads rather than modifying them. For the most part, the products and returns of this enterprise flow abroad or are held in the beachhead cities. Only a relative handful of Latin-Americans have benefited.

If we aim our policies at the problem of the transition from the beachheads, it should be readily apparent that our agricultural surpluses will have great relevance to the immediate problem of massive malnutrition in Latin America. There is great relevance, too, in the capacities of the Export-Import Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank and other sources to the expansion of transportation and communications facilities. Finally, the new aid program authorized by Congress can be pointed directly at the enormous needs in housing, health and education.

Aid from the United States will not help to end the beachheads if it continues to be applied haphazardly. It will be effective only if it moves in coordinated channels toward specific, measurable goals of social and economic development in Latin America.

To bring about such a flow we must first centralize control over the various aid sources within our own Government. Second, we must insist that the Latin-American leaders plan and act with us to use aid in combination with the energies and resources of their respective countries to build sinews, rather than symbols, of modern progress.

Unless we accept for ourselves, and are able through leadership and diplomacy to get recipient countries to accept, the idea of an integrated approach for all future aid activities, development in the Americas is not likely to be brought about under the aegis of freedom. A new and larger sprinkling of aid in the old random pattern will produce little growth. Better prices and a larger market for coffee, sugar or whatever may act as tranquilizers but they will not cure the ill.

As a nation, we have got to face up to that fact. So, too, must the Latin-Americans. That is the challenge to the new administration. It is a challenge to rid our Latin-American policies of sterile slogans and shibboleths which have heretofore obscured the problems. It is a challenge to supply the national and hemispheric leadership and the administrative followthrough that will use existing resources in a concentrated program to enlarge the beachhead societies of Latin America into truly national, democratic states.

The success of that effort is essential to Latin America's future. It is essential to the future of this Nation.

#### RELEASE OF TWO AMERICAN FLIERS BY RUSSIA

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, last week the Soviet Union made a grandstand play by releasing two American fliers Russia had held illegally since last July, when, in a plain act of piracy on the high seas, the Communists shot down a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance bomber over international waters.

Certainly we all rejoice for the men and their families who had been so cruelly and so unnecessarily separated by the Communist pirates.

At the same time, we should not delude ourselves that the cold war is now thawing. This was no act of humanitarianism on the part of the Communists. It was a transparent propaganda move to score a palpable hit with the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, Mr. Khrushchev hopes we will interpret his action as an indication of Soviet willingness to make concessions in the interest of relieving tensions between the two great powers.

As the Washington Post and Times Herald pointed out in an excellent editorial last Friday:

It is no more a concession than the agreement of a recalcitrant child, in expectation of reward, to stop throwing stones or breaking up the furniture.

What reward—or ransom—President Kennedy paid to Mr. Khrushchev for the release of our two fliers held hostage by the Russians has not yet been revealed to the American people. I sincerely hope our new administration has not begun a policy of appeasement as part of its self-styled "quiet diplomacy."

For, if the administration paid a big price to obtain release of 2 Americans, Mr. Khrushchev will demand an even bigger price to reveal the fate of 11 other Americans whose unarmed transport was

shot down by Soviet fighter planes in September 1958. According to a Soviet magazine recently published, the 11 United States airmen parachuted to safety and were promptly imprisoned by the Soviets. The same magazine has just retracted this statement, but doubt persists.

If Mr. Khrushchev truly desires to ease cold war tensions, let him come clean about this incident. If he does not, then we can only assume that he intends to use his captives as political pawns in the cold war, just as he has done in the past.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point three analytical statements on these questions: the Post editorial, an article by David Lawrence in the Washington Evening Star of January 27, and an article by Roscoe Drummond in the Post of January 28.

There being no objection, the editorial and articles were ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1961]

#### CHEERS FOR WHAT?

All Americans will rejoice that the two surviving RB-47 fliers have been released from their prison in the Soviet Union. Unquestionably this move does, as President Kennedy remarked, remove a serious obstacle to peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But before there are too many handclaps, it is useful to analyze what the Soviet Union has really done.

The RB-47 incident was not at all in the category of the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which Mr. Kennedy has wisely ordered not be resumed. In those overflights the United States was legally the offender. The RB-47 was shot down by Soviet planes over international waters, and the affair was misrepresented by the Soviet Union in an obvious attempt to embarrass the United States at the time.

What, then, does the release signify? It merely permits the Soviet Union to purge itself in some degree of an action which was illegal in the first place and which cost the lives of four other Americans. This could have been done at any time during the last 6 months in response to the entreaties of President Eisenhower. The Soviet Government delayed the step in a transparent effort to ingratiate itself with the Kennedy administration with the appearance of a concession.

The release is to be welcomed on its own account, and there will be hopes that it will pave the way for some sort of mutual interest negotiation. But the mere cessation of outrageous behavior makes Mr. Khrushchev not one whit less an implacable adversary. It is no more a concession than the agreement of a recalcitrant child, in expectation of reward, to stop throwing stones or breaking up the furniture.

#### WHAT ABOUT THE OTHERS?—FATE OF 11 FLIERS UNEXPLAINED

(By Roscoe Drummond)

There is every reason to welcome the action of the Soviet Union in freeing the two U.S. fliers whose plane, the RB-47, the Russians shot down over the international waters of the Barents Sea last July.

But it would be an egregious mistake to construe this gesture as in itself easing any of the significant tensions of the cold war or as offering evidence that the Soviets want to negotiate productively with President Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy is making it clear that he does not intend to be drawn into premature,



unprepared summit talks. To him, this means proof that there is some basis for a meeting of minds.

To free two American fliers who should never have been detained and whose plane should never have been shot down (since it was not over Soviet territory) is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Khrushchev wants to settle anything with Mr. Kennedy except on Soviet terms.

It may be evidence that Mr. Khrushchev wants to build a little good will before approaching the new administration on any score. As such it should be accepted for exactly what it is—a rectification of something which was wrong in the first place.

What about the 11 Americans who had not been heard from since their unarmed U.S. transport plane, which lost its bearing a few miles over the Soviet-Turkish frontier in September, 1958, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes?

At that time the Soviets turned over the bodies of six dead U.S. airmen and blandly assured us that they had not seen, had no knowledge of, and had done nothing to the other members of the crew.

The news, which has now come out via East Germany and was reprinted perhaps accidentally by a Soviet magazine, is that the Soviets captured the 11 fliers after they had parachuted to safety and immediately imprisoned them. There is still no word from them or about them: Mr. Khrushchev says he doesn't believe the Soviet magazine.

You will recall that shortly after this incident Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan was visiting Washington in the interests of trade and good will. I recounted something of the behavior in this report at the time:

Mr. Mikoyan put on a heavy act of injured innocence when the President, the Vice President, Secretary Dulles, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee kept asking him about what happened to the 17-man crew of the American plane.

Mr. Mikoyan pulled out all the stops. He was pained; he was hurt; he was mystified; he was excruciatingly baffled by the picky questions which the Americans oddly insisted upon putting to him. He held up his hands in a grand gesture of puzzlement to Mr. Nixon and exclaimed: "Why should we hide anything? Why are Americans so suspicious about this?"

Finally, in his interview with Secretary Dulles he made as though he could stand it no longer and professed to be downright irritated because the officials of the United States did not seem to accept his personal and official assurances that the American transport had not been shot down, that it had crashed of its own fault and that (beyond the 6 bodies of the 17-man crew) the Soviets had told all—absolutely.

We still do not have the answer to Mr. Mikoyan's rhetorical question: "Why should we hide anything?" but we do have the answer to his other question: "Why are Americans so suspicious?"

We are suspicious because the whole Soviet explanation was fishy on its face and the denials have now been found to be untrue. The Soviet magazine, in reprinting an article from an East German Communist publication, discloses that the 11 unreported U.S. fliers were detained by the Soviets and have been held incommunicado ever since. This, despite repeated Soviet statements that they had not found them.

It should not be overlooked that the Soviets took the case of the two U.S. RB-47 fliers, now released, to the U.N. Security Council, demanding that the U.N. condemn the United States for violating international law. When the Security Council suggested the facts be investigated, Russia vetoed this proposal. Preposterous idea, investigating the facts. Now that the two RB-47 fliers have been freed, what about the other 11?

Or does Moscow want to hold them back to build more good will?

[From the Washington Star, Jan. 27, 1961]  
U.S. PRICE FOR RELEASED FLIERS—PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON SOVIET ACTION VIEWED AS LEAVING SOME QUESTIONS

(By David Lawrence)

What ransom price did the U.S. Government pay the Soviet Government to effect the release of the two fliers from the RB-47 who were kidnapped on the high seas and held for 7 months without being permitted to communicate with their own Government? Did this country make any concessions to the Soviets, and, if so, just what were they? Some Senators are asking these questions.

As one studies the transcript of President Kennedy's first news conference, it is apparent that the administration here has not given to the American people the whole story of just what happened in the exchanges of messages between Moscow and Washington in the last few days.

One of the newsmen asked this question: "Mr. President, can you tell us something about what your role was, if you had one, in the release of these fliers? Did this come about as a consequence of some action you took?"

Mr. Kennedy did not answer the question. He simply said that "this matter has been under discussion" by the American Ambassador in Moscow and Soviet authorities.

The reporters were not satisfied with this avoidance of the issue and asked the President this question:

"In consequence of Mr. Khrushchev's apparent indication last week of a willingness to release the American fliers, have you sent any communication to him through Ambassador Thompson or otherwise?"

Mr. Kennedy's answer was: "We have had several exchanges with the Soviet authorities. I do not believe that one has taken place since the release of the prisoners."

Later in the news conference, there was a further colloquy on this subject:

Question: "Did the Russians ask any quid pro quo or did we make any concessions to them in exchange for the release of these fliers? If not, how do you account for this remarkable turnabout in their relations with us?"

Answer: "The statement which I have made is a statement which the U.S. Government put forward on this matter, which I read to you earlier in regard to overflights. I would not attempt to make a judgment as to why the Soviet Union chose to release them at this time. I did say in my statement to Mr. Arrowsmith (earlier in the press conference) that this had removed a serious obstacle in the way of peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and I would judge that they desire to remove that serious obstacle."

Question: "Does that mean, sir, that they accepted a reassurance of no more overflights as an exchange?"

Answer: "It is a fact that I have ordered that the flights not be resumed, which is a continuation of the order given by President Eisenhower in May of last year."

This leaves unanswered exactly how and why and when the pledge was given to the Soviet Union that no more U-2 overflights would be authorized.

For one thing, Mr. Kennedy made it clear at the news conference that the shooting down of the RB-47 was in an entirely different category from the U-2 incident. Actually, the RB-47's fliers were forced down over the open seas, where they had a right to be. If there was no connection between the U-2 flights and the RB-47 incident, the question naturally arises as to why Mr. Kennedy felt it necessary to announce that during the discussions with the Soviet Union on the

release of the RB-47 fliers assurances had been given that the U-2 flights would not be resumed.

The inference is clear that, whether the commitment not to resume U-2 flights was given in a conversation at Moscow by Ambassador Thompson during the last few days separate from the one about the RB-47 fliers, the Soviets themselves took the two to be related and based their action on it.

In other words, the Soviets wanted to appear before the world as having achieved a diplomatic victory, and so they insisted upon some assurance concerning the overflights. When this was given, the Soviets of their own initiative decided to release the fliers. It may well be argued whether the United States was party to a "deal" but the plain facts are that, simultaneously with the release of the RB-47 fliers, a commitment was announced by President Kennedy that there would be no more U-2 overflights.

This is in some respects a disappointing turn of events. The United States has a right to fly far above the ground and the Soviet Union insists upon the same right when it sends satellites around the globe that take photographs from high altitudes—a form of observation for military purposes.

There is no pledge as yet, moreover, that the Soviet Union will stop its espionage here in the United States or infiltration in other parts of the world, particularly Cuba, where it is openly assisting a government that is hostile to the United States.

Mr. Kennedy struggled through the press conference without making a definite statement as to how much the United States conceded to get the release of fliers whom the Soviets, of course, had no right to force down in the first place.

#### DEDICATION OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, MIAMI, FLA.

MR. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD a speech which I gave in Miami, Fla., November 20, 1960. The speech was delivered at a banquet held for fund-raising purposes for the proposed Osteopathic General Hospital of North Miami Beach, Fla.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH OF THE HONORABLE WAYNE MORSE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON, NOVEMBER 20, 1960, MIAMI, FLA.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have gathered together tonight not only to dedicate the financial drive for a wonderful North Miami Beach Osteopathic General Hospital to its noble purposes, but also to rededicate ourselves to the moral obligation of promoting man's humanity to man. The privilege and trust inherent in your invitation to participate with you in this dedication ceremony moves me very deeply.

As the offices of the American Osteopathic Association well know, during my 16 years in the Senate I have always supported and will continue to support equality of consideration for members of the osteopathic school of medicine in any medical hospital or medical research program in which the Federal Government may play a part.

This proposed hospital in a very real sense will be both a physical monument to, and an inspiring symbol of the self-sacrifices of the many men and women both in and out of the osteopathic profession who will make this haven of mercy and medical care a reality. As the American Osteopathic Association has stated, "Your osteopathic hospital is more than bricks and stainless steel, more than costly equipment and specially